

Mr. ROTH. Let me make—I do not want to interrupt.

Mr. WARNER. No. Please go ahead.

Mr. ROTH. Let me point out those findings were general findings. But the fact is, the up-to-date intelligence that Washington had in the days immediately before Pearl Harbor was not made available to General Short or Admiral Kimmel.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, that sum portion of intelligence, I think that all throughout history has been conceded. And these tribunals, particularly the Congress, had that before it. It is for that reason maybe they were not court-martialed and incarcerated, if found guilty.

Mr. ROTH. Yes, you knew an air carrier attack was possible. But to know, for example, as they knew in Washington in the days right before the attack that the Japanese wanted to know where the warships were located, it was this kind of information that gave immediacy to the threat. To me, that was critical.

You talk about the Dorn Report. Let me just say, as part of the Dorn Report, they sort of are all over the map in their finding. They say:

It is clear today, as should have been clear since 1946 to any serious reader of the JCC hearing record, that Admiral Kimmel and General Short were not solely responsible for the defeat at Pearl Harbor.

\* \* \* more information was available in Washington but not forwarded to them. Army and Navy officials in Washington were privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications (notably the "bomb plot", "winds", "pilot", and "fourteen-part" messages) which provided crucial—

Now, this is the Dorn report—

which provided crucial confirmation of the imminence of war. Read together and with the leisure, focus, and clarity of hindsight, these messages point strongly towards an attack on Pearl Harbor at dawn on the 7th.

That is the Dorn Report:

The immediacy of an attack on Pearl Harbor at dawn on the 7th.

The evidence of the handling of these messages in Washington reveals some ineptitude, some unwarranted assumptions and misstatements, limited coordination, ambiguous language and lack of clarification and followup at higher levels.

I could go on.

A careful reading of the proceedings and reports of those panels suggests clear recognition of the faults at all levels. Yet these two gentlemen were singled out and were not given advance to their wartime rating.

I think it was inequitable. I think it was not fair, and it seems to me the greatness of this country is that we can go back and make changes where warranted.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I have just located, I think, a document that interests me a great deal. It is entitled, "Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack: Report of the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Har-

bor Attack," pursuant to a resolution of Congress, S. Res. 27. And it was reported on July 5, 1946.

Just listen to those Senators who were on this commission: Alben Barkley, you remember him. What an extraordinary man; Walter George, George was considered one of the great, great internationalists; Scott Lucas of Illinois, one of the most senior Senators from the State of Illinois, the Presiding Officer's State; Owen Brewster from Maine; Homer Ferguson from Michigan.

I say to my good friend, those names still reverberate with absolute distinction and credibility in this Chamber today. They made the findings which left history intact. And we here, just the two of us, really, on the floor tonight, are to urge our colleagues tomorrow to reverse that history?

With all due respect, there is not the foundation, in my judgment, for the Senate to so act and overrule the findings of these men.

Mr. ROTH. Mr. President, as the Senator knows, I have the greatest respect for his soundness of judgment, for his honesty and integrity. I have the same for the Senators named. But the fact remains, honorable men and women often disagree. Here we do disagree.

I am just trying to join my colleagues—there are 23 of us—in seeking to correct what we think was unfair treatment to two individuals who devoted a lifetime of service to this country. Yes, there are differences of opinion on this matter, but nothing seems to me more important than to try to correct a record which I think, on the basis of the studies I have seen, results in unfairness. We are trying to correct that.

I understand you disagree with the basis of our proposal, but I think both of us want the same thing, and that is fairness.

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, there is no one in this body for whom I have greater respect than my dear friend and colleague, Senator ROTH. He has put a lot of work, together with his able staff, into this case. But it seems to me that we stand in a momentous hour in the history of this country. We are asking our colleagues to trust in our own judgments and our findings as to whether or not one of the most remarkable and tragic chapters in the history of this Nation, in effect, should have this significant reversal these many years hence, based on no new evidence, based on the fervent plea of my colleagues, Senator ROTH and Senator THURMOND.

I shall take the floor tomorrow and most vigorously oppose this. I think for the night we have pretty well concluded this debate. I have to tell the Senator, it is an interesting one for me and not altogether without some implications in my own life, thinking back in that period of history. I will never forget Pearl Harbor.

If I could just reminisce for a moment, it is hard to believe that shortly thereafter this city, the Nation's Capital, endured periods of blackout. I remember it very well, as a small—well, I wasn't so small. I remember my father was a physician and he was able to drive at night only with a slit on the headlights to get to the hospital. I remember very well our home was equipped with blackout curtains. All the streetlights went out. We were fearful of an attack here in Washington, DC, and, indeed, other east coast cities. There were Nazi submarines patrolling off the east coast of the United States, sinking ships.

How well I recall on the beaches of Virginia there was washed up debris from sunken ships. The people on the west coast lived in constant fear that there would be an invasion. These were serious and strenuous times, calling on the men and women of the Armed Forces for a duty and a commitment and an assumption of risk without parallel, because this Nation in many respects was unprepared. How well we recall the pictures of the Army practicing maneuvers with broomsticks rather than rifles.

When I think of the tragic death, loss of life and property, indeed, if we were to follow your logic—President Roosevelt had that intelligence—we could go back and judge the record of many others. It seems to me that what is before the Senate tonight is clear facts that men and women of clear conscience, with the ability to assess fresh information, have painstakingly gone through it, reached their conclusion year after year, and then a President, Harry Truman, is my recollection, am I correct, made the decision that he did with respect to these two officers.

I just do not believe that the Senate at this time should reverse that history.

#### MORNING BUSINESS

Mr. WARNER. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the Senate now proceed to a period of morning business with Senators permitted to speak for up to 10 minutes each.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### THE VERY BAD DEBT BOXSCORE

Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at the close of business Friday, May 21, 1999, the federal debt stood at \$5,596,857,521,196.34 (Five trillion, five hundred ninety-six billion, eight hundred fifty-seven million, five hundred twenty-one thousand, one hundred ninety-six dollars and thirty-four cents).

One year ago, May 21, 1998, the federal debt stood at \$5,503,780,000,000 (Five trillion, five hundred three billion, seven hundred eighty million).